This paper explores the interrelations between budget deficits and structural reforms in a monetary union. The analysis considers the international spillovers generated by both policies. We show that efforts to achieve fiscal policy coordination within the Eurozone reduce member countries' incentives to carry out much-needed structural reforms. As a consequence, this cooperation can turn out to be welfare-reducing if it is not extended to the implementation of structural reforms.
Introduction
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has sparked a lively debate on how community institutions should be designed so that they can provide macroeconomic stability and stimulate economic growth in the euro zone. Two aspects of this debate have received a great deal of attention due to their special relevance. On the one hand, the convenience of adopting rules that help discipline the fiscal policies implemented by the member states. On the other hand, the design of the right incentives that governments in the union should face so that they implement a sufficient level of structural reforms that make their economies more dynamic and competitive.
The need for coordinating fiscal policies in the EMU was highlighted in the Delors Report (1989) , which considered it as a prerequisite for a successful monetary integration. Then, after the commitments reached in the Maastricht Treaty (1991) , this political process culminated with the signing of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) at the Council of Amsterdam in 1997. This agreement represents the operational response of EU countries to the quest for fiscal coordination in the euro area. It contemplates the possibility of imposing sanctions to the member states whose budget deficits are considered "excessive".
The European Commission has emphasized the need of having an institution as the SGP arguing that when one member country incurs a fiscal deficit it makes the other partners worse-off. As HM Treasury (2004) has pointed out, if the cost of unsustainable fiscal policies falls entirely within the country that carries them out, they need not be the concern of area-wide rules. However, they can have adverse spillovers in a monetary union and become a concern for other member countries. The existence of such "negative externalities" has found support in a active line of investigation (see, for instance, Artis and Winkler, 1998; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999; Casella, 1999; Chalk and Tanzi, 2002; Beestma and Jensen, 2003; and Fatás and Mihow, 2003) . First, it has been argued that when one member country's deficit increases interest rates go up in the whole EMU, which will lower investment in the area and, therefore, economic growth. On the other hand, since these fiscal imbalances increase the stock of public debt, they can give rise to a sustainability problem. In such scenario, it has been argued that the monetary authorities would come under political pressure to monetize the debt, which could erode the monetary authorities's credibility for fighting inflation. In this respect, the recent fiscal crisis in Greece has caused great concern among the other members of the union. In fact, this lack of fiscal discipline has extended the risk of contagion through the banking sector within the union.
Having said that, the fundamental criticism received by the SGP is based on the claim that this institution hampers the national fiscal authorities's ability to stabilize their economies in the face of adverse shocks (see, for instance, Bovenberg et al., 1991; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995; Dornbusch, 1997; Engwerda et al., 2002; Enderlein, 2004; Solow, 2004 and De Grauwe, 2007) .
The existence of deep differences in opinion on the relative importance attached to the pros and cons of the pact has not helped build a wide consensus on the desirability of this fiscal institution. On the contrary, the SGP has been a source of political frictions among signing countries, specially after Germany and France escaped the sanctions contemplated under the SGP for incurring excessive budget deficits. This event created a precedent that damaged the credibility of the pact. As a consequence, a process of redesign of SGP took place. The European Council agreed to fundamental changes to the pact which made its rules more flexible (ECOFIN (2005)). To wit, even if a country's budget deficit is in violation of the 3 percent rule, the new arrangement allows for a wide range of reasons ("any relevant factors", as it reads) why the member state in question will not be fined. This new approach has been criticized (see, for example, Hefeker, 2005 ; Deutsche Bundesbank's Monthly Report of April 2005 or Beetsma and Debrun, 2007) on the grounds that it is based on countryspecific provisions which make the rules more complex, less transparent and, therefore, ultimately even more difficult to enforce.
As for the second aspect of the debate on the community institutions referred to above, a wide consensus has emerged on the need to implement structural reforms if the union is to achieve the goal stated in the Lisbon Council (2000) . Namely, to be the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world. The importance of structural reforms underlies the widespread perception that EMU economies have had a worse performance than that of the United States. It is also widely accepted that, since structural reforms eliminate market rigidities and correct market failures, they increase the flexibility of the economy, enhance its resilience against economic shocks and ultimately result in a higher long-term growth potential (see, for example, Trichet, 2004) .
The aim of our paper is to explore the interrelations between the implementation of structural reforms and the determination of fiscal polices in the context of the EMU. With the purpose of focusing on the strategic aspects involved, we have adopted a game-theoretic approach.
Our paper is related to the ongoing recent literature that analyzes whether or not the focus on fiscal coordination derived from Maastricht and SGP is consistent with the goal of the Lisbon agenda (see Girardi and Paesani, 2008 for a review). Sapir et al. (2004) consider that a tight implementation of the EU fiscal rules supports the Lisbon objectives because the only domestic policy that is available to adjust the home economy is the realization of structural reforms. This optimistic view has been questioned on the grounds that the EU fiscal rules reduce the budgetary room for manoeuvre and the political capital of governments. As a result, these rules may deter the implementation of structural reforms. In this respect, Razin and Sadka (2002) have pointed out that these reforms may, at least initially, worsen budget deficits due to direct budgetary costs. Saint-Paul (2002) and Hughes Hallet et al. (2005) consider that a supportive fiscal stance may be needed to obviate the temporary widening output gap associated with reforms. Buti et al. (2007) show that, depending on the time horizon of the government, fiscal discipline may strengthen or weaken structural reforms. Finally, Debrun (2004a, 2007) and Ribeiro and Beetsma (2008) show that, insofar as a government with electoral uncertainty is more concerned about the present than the future and reforms give rise to future benefits but present costs, a fiscal pact can help mitigate the deficit bias that arises in this kind of environments. However, this outcome is achieved at the expense of a suboptimal low level of structural reforms.
Our approach is related to Debrun (2004a, 2007) and Ribeiro and Beestma (2008) but differs from the one adopted by these authors mainly in two respects. On the one hand, our analysis is not developed in a closed economy model. On the contrary, we adopt an open economy framework where the externalities generated by fiscal and reforms policies play a key role. On the other hand, in our work governments have the social preferences (i.e., they are benevolent) which implies that our model is absent of exogenous electoral uncertainty.
In a model à la Sibert (1999) , we show that, when fiscal and structural reforms policies are not determined in a cooperative way, budget deficits are excessive from the social welfare point of view and the level of reforms is suboptimally low. Under these circumstances we characterize an cooperative arrangement consisting of a set of rules that penalize deficits and the nonimplementation of reforms in member countries so that the efficient outcome is achieved. However, credibility of such an institution is not supported by recent evidence within the EMU. Therefore, we depart from this benchmark scenario and consider an alternative setting where this kind of rules are nonexistent or, which is equivalent, cannot be enforced.
In this scenario, and given the emphasis that the European Commission has put on the need for strengthening the coordination of fiscal policies among member states, we analyze the case where budgetary objectives are not determined by rigid ex-ante rules but through cooperative agreements that take account of the structural reforms and the realizations of the shocks. This kind of coordination could be achieved by means of the decisions made within a strengthened Euro Group. However, we show that this type of ad hoc coordination, reduces the incentives to implement structural reforms to the point that it might render fiscal cooperation counterproductive. That is, member countries' welfare could worsen in comparison with the scenario where budget deficits are decided at the national level. This result emphasizes the need to extend policy coordination to the design of structural reforms, therefore supporting the ongoing consensus in EMU. In the words of Almunia (2004) , former European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs: 'it is very clear that we need to coordinate more our actions on structural reforms and our efforts to implement the Lisbon agenda. It is also clear that we cannot rely exclusively on one instrument, the Stability and Growth Pact, to coordinate our economic policies'.
This analysis provides an explanation why, despite the widespread view among EMU members on the need to carry out a sufficiently high level of structural reforms, national governments are behaving as if they had not the right incentives to do so. Moreover, in the present economic context, where member countries seem to be unable to escape the world economy slowdown, the paper highlights the risk of focusing on fiscal policy coordination but delaying important structural reforms.
Moreover, our approach sheds light on the recent fiscal crisis in Greece. The negative external effects on the other members of the union generated by its fast growing budget deficits and huge debt are shown to be caused in part by the lack of incentives that Greece has to carry out the required structural reforms. This problem, also faced by other members of the union, is specially severe for this country, because its government has been too weak to afford the political costs of pushing through long-delayed unpopular structural reforms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 is devoted to the results. Section 4 concludes. Computations not included in the text are gathered in the Appendix.
The Model
We consider a monetary union, say the EMU, which is made up of two countries (i = 1, 2). The government in each country has the social preferences represented by the following loss function:
where i, j = 1, 2; i 6 = j; σ, e φ, α, β > 0; α ≥ β and x is a stochastic disturbance with zero mean and finite variance (E (x 2 )). We begin by explaining the first term of expression (1). Country i's economy has an initial level of rigidity inherited from the past, φ. However, the e greater the level of structural reforms implemented in the period of analysis, φ i , the lower the final level of economic rigidity, φ − φ i ; and, therefore, the e more resilient the economy will become to a common shock which generates an output gap ³ e φ − φ i´x . On the other hand, once governments have carried out their structural reforms and the realization of the shock is observed, they can make use of the budget deficit, d i , to stabilize the economies.
The second term of the loss function in (1) refers to the negative effects that own and foreign deficits have on social welfare. We assume that the social cost of own country's deficit is no lower than that of the other country's (α ≥ β). First, when the public sector incurs indebtedness, it passes a financial burden to future generations without their approval. Second, when deficit increases, it causes interest rates to rise at home and abroad, lowering investment and economic growth on the whole currency area. This reasoning assumes that the Ricardian Equivalence does not hold. In this sense, it is well known that this hypothesis is based on many restrictive assumptions. Therefore, it is no surprise that this postulate has not received considerable empirical support (see, for example, Bernheim, 1989; Seater, 1993; Kandil, 2001; and Brunila, 2002) . Third, the greater the budget deficit the greater the stock of public debt and the higher the risk of facing a sustainability problem. If this problem arose, the monetary authorities would come under political pressure to monetize the debt, which would erode their anti-inflationary credibility.
The third term of (1) represents the costs associated to the implementations of structural reforms. Some studies have highlighted the existence of such costs on the following grounds (see, for instance Sibert, 1999; and Sibert and Sutherland, 2000) . First, the uncertainty associated to the future implementation of reforms is an obstacle which prevents firms and consumers from making efficient decisions. Second, changes in tax laws modify the way in which accountancy is put into practice giving rise to "menu costs". Finally, reforms can cause an undesirable income redistribution and lobbies will struggle to protect their status quo. Notice that the positive parameters σ and δ are, respectively, the weights that the government puts on the costs of output variability and reforms (relative to the costs generated by deficits).
We model the interactions between fiscal and reforms policies by considering a multi-stage game. The sequence of events is as follows:
1) Governments decide the levels of reforms (φ i ).
2) Nature chooses the realization of the shock (x).
3) Fiscal authorities determine the budget deficits (d i ).
It is worth noting that in this timing the determination of reforms comes before the selection of the budgets deficits. This is in accordance with the fact that the implementation of reforms is a much more irreversible process than the determination of the fiscal variables (budget deficits can be adjusted more easily in the face of economic shocks).
The paper analyzes the case where the realization of the shock x takes a positive value (i.e. generating an economic slowdown in the union). In this scenario, as will be shown in the next section, fiscal authorities will run budget deficits with the aim of stabilizing their own economy. The opposite case where x is negative is not considered in the paper. In such scenario governments would end up having fiscal superavits. We do not explore this setting since we focus on the attempts carried out within the EMU to coordinate fiscal policies, and such attempts have never aimed at preventing superavits in public finances but excessive deficits.
Our paper assumes that the role of the fiscal policy is to stabilize the economy. In practice, two types of fiscal instruments are available for this purpose. Namely, the automatic stabilizers, designed prior to knowing the realization of the shock, and the discretional measures implemented after this realization becomes common knowledge. It is widely accepted that the countercyclical effect of the automatic stabilizers has an empirical support. However, the stabilizing role of the discretionary component of fiscal policy has generated an active debate. Hemming et al. (2002) have surveyed the empirical and theoretical literature on this topic and concludes that fiscal multipliers are overwhelmingly positive but small and Feldstein (2002) shows that discretionary fiscal policy can play a constructive role in a sustained downturn when aggregate demand and interest rates are low and when prices are falling or may soon be falling. In this sense, the present worldwide slowdown is prompting governments to implement non-negligible discretionary fiscal stimulus packages so as to stabilize their faltering economies.
A conclusion that could be drawn from the timing assumed in the paper is that we just focus on discretionary fiscal policy. However, as will become apparent in what follows, the same results are obtained if we assume that fiscal policy only consists of determining the levels of the automatic stabilizers, namely, budget deficits are state-contingent functions (designed prior to realization of the shock).
Throughout the paper, different equilibria will be obtained and evaluated making use of quadratic loss functions. This type of functions is widely used in the literature on international policy coordination (Obstfeld and Ro-goff, 1996, chapter 9) . On the other hand, Dixit and Lambertini (2003 a,b) and Woodford (2003, chapter 6) have shown that this type of quadratic objective functions builds on microeconomic foundations, since they can be obtained starting from the utility function of a representative agent. In addition, the intuition captured by this type of functions have been emphasized by former vice-president of the FED, Alan Blinder (1998) , who pointed out that policymakers employ their instruments in such a way that only "small" variations in the economic variables take place and for this type of changes any convex objective function is approximately quadratic. This paper considers two different types of coordination, which have been labeled in this literature as ex-ante coordination and ex-post coordination (see for instance Beetsma et al., 2001) . The former, refers to the case where the economic authorities set rules prior to having observed the realizations of the shocks. The SGP in its initial version would had fallen within this category if the fines it contemplated would had been applied to countries whose deficits exceeded the reference level specified in the agreement. Had it been the case, this community fiscal institution would had been a credible commitment determined prior to stage 1 (in stage 0). By contrast, cooperation ex-post is ad-hoc and takes place on the basis of the current state of affairs, that is, taking into account the realization of the shock. In our context, this kind of coordination develops in the third stage. The Eurogroup can be viewed as a vehicle for implementing this regime. In the words of Strauss-Kahn (1997) , the purpose of the creation of Eurogroup was both political 'to avoid the ECB being regarded as responsible for growth' and economic 'to match increased monetary interdependence by closer economic and budgetary cooperation'. In this sense, Pisani-Ferry (2002) argues that Eurogroup should agree on a set of broad non-binding policy principles outlining the operation of fiscal policy to assist fiscal coordination.
In addition to the ad-hoc reduced form structure of the model, our analysis has two main limitations: (a) it could be argued that the stabilization of demand shocks does not fall under the responsibility of national fiscal authorities but the common central bank; and (b) the model is static. However, the first limitation is not very restrictive in the European context because the conduct of the monetary policy is assigned to an independent central bank whose mandate emphasizes price stability rather than output stabilization. As for the second limitiation, we follow a strand of literature that makes abstraction of the dynamic aspects related to the government intertemporal budget restriction with the aim of focusing on the strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal policies (see, for instance, Agell et al., 1996; Dixit, 2001; Dixit and Lambertini, 2001; 2003a,b, Beetsma and Debrun, 2004b) . Moreover, as stated by Agell et al.( 1996) , if the Ricardian Equivalence is not satisfied, the government intertemporal budget constraint is not relevant. Alternatively, they argue that this restriction is not binding in the short run and, therefore, the strategies of the players involved can be modelled by a multi-stage game as the one described above.
The Results
We begin by analyzing the determination of budget deficits and structural reforms when both types of policy decisions are determined at the national level. Then, we explore the way in which this regime departs from the efficient outcome. Next, we characterize a commitment technology that achieves the social optimum in a decentralized way. Finally, considering that this baseline scenario lacks credibility (i.e., is unfeasible in practice), we study two alternative regimes. In the first one, fiscal authorities in both counties coordinate their policies ex-post. In the second scenario, countries collectively determine the level of their structural reforms.
Sovereign policies on budget deficits and structural reforms
In this subsection we consider the regime where decisions on budget deficits and structural reforms belong to the national level. This non-cooperative behavior is modeled by making use of the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium. Therefore, we apply backward induction to the game outlined in section 2. In the last stage, once the level of structural reforms and the realization of the shocks are known, each government selects the size of its budget deficit with the aim of minimizing its country's social loss, taking its counterpart's as given. Formally, each government faces the following problem:
where i, j = 1, 2; i 6 = j. From the first-order condition, we obtain the reaction function of the fiscal authorities in each country:
Now, solving simultaneously the reaction functions of the fiscal authorities yields the following Nash equilibrium:
Finally, in the first stage, bearing in mind expression (3) and prior to knowing the realization of the shock, governments implement structural reforms without cooperation. That is, the government in country i minimizes the expected value of its country's social loss. Analytically, it solves:
giving rise to the following reaction function:
where
. The Nash equilibrium is achieved by the intersection of the both reaction functions (i = 1, 2):
The superscript "N" appearing in (5) and (6) stands for "Nash equilibrium". Another implication is that the equilibrium level of structural reforms do not reach its ceiling φ i < ³ e φ´since we have that the denominator of (5) is positive. Therefore, reforms are insufficient to completely eliminate the output variability caused by adverse shocks. On the other hand, taking into account structural reforms (expression (5)), budget deficits will be (substituting (5) into (3)):
In order to analyze the optimality of this outcome, we need to determine the levels of structural reforms and budget deficits which would be selected by a benevolent social planner. With this aim, we begin by solving the last stage of this ideal scenario. That is, at the end of the game and knowing the values of the structural reforms and the realization of the shock, the planner would choose the level of the deficits so as to minimize the joint social loss. Formally the problem faced by this supranational authority would be:
The solution yields:
Now, in the first stage the planner would determine the level of reforms that would minimize the expected joint social loss, bearing in mind (7). Namely, the problem to be solved would be:
whose result is:
The superscript "O" appearing in (8) and (9) stands for "Optimum". On the other hand, notice that since the denominator of (8) is positive then φ o i < e φ. That is, it is not optimal to completely eliminate the rigidity of the economy since that would be too costly for society. Substituting (8) into (7) we obtain the efficient levels for deficits:
Result 1: When decisions on fiscal policy and structural reforms are made at the national level, budget deficits are suboptimally high and the level of reforms is suboptimally low.
Proof: See Appendix.
The first part of this result is rather straightforward. That is, since deficits generate negative externalities, a prisoners's dilemma arises in the noncooperative equilibrium, which implies that they are excessive from the welfare point of view (because these externalities are not internalized). However, in order to understand the intuition why structural reforms are suboptimally low we need to realize that the externalities that these reforms generate are positive. In order to understand this, first notice that budget deficits are strategic substitutes (using the terminology of Bulow et al. (1985) ), namely, an increase in the fiscal deficit of country j induces the authorities of country i to reduce its own fiscal deficit (see reaction functions R i and R j , derived from (2)). The reason why this is so is that when the foreign country runs a higher budget deficit interest rates and the risk of a debt monetization increase. This provides the home country with incentives to run a lower deficit (i.e., to avoid a higher second component in (1)).
By the same token, structural reforms are also strategic substitutes. When the foreign country implements more reforms its own economy becomes more resilient to shocks. Therefore, it will run lower fiscal deficits generating less (negative) externalities. This will improve home country's welfare. In other words, structural reforms generate positive externalities. Graphically, when country j carries out more reforms its reaction function shifts downwards and the Nash equilibrium moves from N to N´. This decreases its own deficit, leaving more room for using fiscal stabilization in the other country which, therefore, is made better-off. This welfare improvement (i.e. the positive sign of the externalities generated by reforms) is implied by country i's achieving an isoloss curve which is less distant from its bliss point.
Therefore, because reforms generate positive externalities and are costly to implement, the absence of coordination leads to a free riding problem. That is, countries carry out a suboptimally low level of reforms because they fail to take into account the beneficial impact that a more active reform policy has on the other member countries welfare.
It is also worth noting that the above analysis is based in the assumption that decision on the structural reforms are made by benevolent governments, i.e., we set aside the political incentives that increase the cost for the government to carry out structural reforms. Including these opportunistic elements into the analysis would increase the cost of carrying out structural reforms (it would be greater than δ in (1)). In such setting, and taking into account that ∂d N i ∂δ > 0 (from (6)) and ∂φ N i ∂δ < 0 (from (5)), the outcome would be even more distant from the optimal one (and would depart in the same direction).
This point could help discuss the Greece's debt crisis. Its weak government could not afford the political costs of pushing through long-delayed unpopular structural reform. As a result, it implemented a level of reforms even lower than the one achieved in the prisoner's dilemma equilibrium with benevolent governments. This, in turn, would have made its economy even more vulnerable to the global economic downturn and therefore, more dependent on fiscal stabilization. In other words, these political factors would have pushed the Greek's budget deficit even higher, i.e., increasing its distance from the first-best. In contrast, even though other members of the union have also had unusual high deficits, their problem has not been as severe as the one in Greece and markets have taking account of this situation penalizing the Greek debt to a greater extent.
Notice also that we assume that the focus of the fiscal policy is the stabilization of the economy. In practice, fiscal stabilization is a result of the combined effects of automatic stabilizers (designed before the realization of the shock takes place) and discretionary fiscal policy that complements the stabilization carried out by automatic stabilizers. In the timing we assume that fiscal policy is entirely discretional, but notice that our results hold if we assume that fiscal policy rests exclusively on automatic stabilizers. In such case, fiscal deficits would be state-contingent functions designed prior to the realization of the shock (see (3)). Therefore, deficits would be suboptimally high and structural reforms suboptimally low.
Finally, our analysis rests on the assumption that external effects of the budget deficits are negative. This view underpins the rules embedded in the SGP and is consistent with the concern exhibited in the Greece's fiscal crisis by the other members of the union. However, it has been argued that a higher external demand via own budget deficit could give rise to a positive spillover that could overcome the negative external effects (see Beestma et. al (2001, p. 64-65) ). In our model that would imply that these external effects are positive (i.e. β < 0). This would affect the nature of the conflict among governments described here. Notice that, in such a case, budget deficits and structural reforms would be strategic complements. That is, reaction functions would be upward sloping in both the (d i , d j ) and the ¡ φ i , φ j ¢ spaces (see (2) and (4)). Therefore the conclusion in Result 1 would be reversed. First, budget deficits would be suboptimally low (each country would fail to take into account the positive effects of its deficit on its neighbor) and an institution fostering high deficits would be called for (just the opposite of the SGP). And second, the level of reforms would be suboptimally high, which would require rules that run counter the Lisbon Council view.
Our paper does not follow this latter route but assumes that fiscal deficits generate negative externalities, which rationalizes the proposals for coordination in fiscal and reforms policy within the union and the worries expressed by the other European partners in the recent fiscal crisis in Greece.
Optimal commitment technology
We now analyze an scenario in which such externalities are internalized by a coordination ex-ante. This type of cooperation is based on agreements among countries that determine a set of "rules of the game". This institutional framework provides the right incentives to achieve the efficient outcome, even though reforms and deficits are determined in a non-cooperative fashion. The rationalizations of macroeconomic institutions have been most usually based on the existence of a time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy. However, other arguments for providing institutional solutions are the need for coordinating: a) economic policies among countries (Persson and Tabellini, 1995; and Jensen, 2000) ; and b) monetary and fiscal policy within one economic area (Agell et al., 1996; Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1997; Debrun, 2000; and Dixit and Lambertini, 2003a) .
In order to determine such a commitment technology, we continue to assume that the sequence of events is the one described in section 2, with the only exception that we now introduce a new stage at the very beginning of the game. In such a "stage 0" (that comes before stage 1) an international principal sets some penalties rates on budget deficits (t) and on the nonimplementation of reforms (g). More precisely, the objective function of each government becomes:
Applying backward induction to the resulting enlarged game we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1: When policies are decided at the national level, the efficient outcome is achieved if the penalty rates on deficits and on the nonimplementation of structural reforms are, respectively, t = β (α + β) and g =
Proposition 1 shows that the coordination failure can be resolved through institutional arrangements modeled as "quadratic contracts" à la Jensen (2000) that penalize deviations from the optimal policy mix. Therefore, it would be optimal for the European Commission to apply rules that influence the course of fiscal policy and the implementation of structural reforms. However, in the case of the EMU, it could be argued that the enforcement of such rules is not credible given the absence of a full-fledged political union. In fact, the final decision on the actions to be taken against countries which renege on commitments ultimately depends on councils, some of whose components are representatives of the sovereign states that did not honored the agreements. Therefore, such rules would be more credible if their enforcement were assigned to the European Commission or some independent committee. As a result, in the subsequent subsections we explore other settings in which this kind of rules aimed at achieving a cooperation ex-ante, even if they exist, lack credibility which implies that they are not operative.
Fiscal coordination ex-post
We now consider the case where fiscal cooperation takes place without setting rigid rules as the ones implied by the SGP in its initial version. On the contrary, we assume that this coordination occurs ex-post, that is, in the last stage of the game. In that moment, structural reforms have been implemented and the realizations of the shocks have been observed. In the context of the EMU this kind of coordination could be achieved by means of a strengthened Euro Group.
In this case, and considering that cooperation is not extended to the implementation of structural reforms, when deciding the level of such reforms each governments solves in the first stage (bearing in mind (3)):
The solutions yields:
As a consequence, in the third stage budget deficits will take the following value (substituting (10) into (3)):
Result 2: In the regime of fiscal coordination ex-post the levels of reforms and budget deficits are, respectively, lower and greater than in the social optimum.
The intuitive explanation of this result is as follows. The only difference between the regime of fiscal cooperation ex-post and the one which achieves the social optimum is the way in which the first stage is played. That is, in the former scenario structural reforms are determined in a non-cooperative fashion whereas in the latter such reforms are implemented with cooperation. For this reason, only the former regime fails to internalize the externalities generated by reforms. As a consequence, since these spillovers are positive, in the regime of fiscal cooperation ex-post the level of reforms will be lower than in the social optimum. This means that in the former scenario the level of rigidity of the economy will be higher making it more vulnerable to adverse shocks. As a result, the need to incur a budget deficit will be greater when in an economic downturn. Now we compare the regime of fiscal coordination ex-post with the scenario where all players act in a non-cooperative fashion.
Result 3: In the regime of fiscal coordination ex-post, budget deficits and the levels of structural reforms are lower than in the scenario where both policies are determined at the national level.
We obtain this conclusion because the two regimes referred to in Result 3 just differ in the last stage. That is, in comparison with the case where this fiscal policy stage develops in a non-cooperative way, in the regime with fiscal cooperation lower deficits are expected because they generate negative externalities (for any combination of reforms in both countries). Therefore, this triggers a lower level of structural reforms in both countries. Why? Because one of the reasons why reforms are implemented is that, costly though they are, they reduce the incentives to run budgets deficits and their negative effects on welfare (expressed by the second term in (1))
To end up this subsection we present the following proposition which puts into question the convenience of the regime in which cooperation is carried out just in the last stage of the game:
Proposition 2: If structural reforms are carried out in a non-cooperative fashion, implementing fiscal coordination ex-post can be counterproductive.
Result 3 and the expression for society's objective function in (1) help understand why we obtain Proposition 2. To wit, comparing the case of fiscal coordination ex-post with the scenario in which no stage develops in a cooperative fashion, the former regime has pros and cons. As for the advantages, on the one hand, for any combination of reforms deficits (that generate negative externalities) are lower in the former case (second term, (αd i + βd j ) 2 , in (1)); and, on the other hand, the fact that the structural reforms are implemented to a lesser extent in the cooperation ex-post scenario implies that the cost of carrying them out is reduced (third term, δ (φ i ) 2 , in (1)). However, this cooperative regime has a clear-cut disadvantage which can be more easily understood with an inspection of the first term in (1) (σ
Namely, since reforms are reduced, economies become less flexible and more vulnerable to adverse shocks. Furthermore, with a more passive fiscal policy its anticyclical role is hampered.
To sum up, the drawbacks associated to the regime of coordination ex-post can more than offset its advantages in comparison with the scenario where no cooperation takes place.
Cooperative implementation of structural reforms
Finally, in this subsection, we consider a context where countries's coordination efforts focus only on structural reforms. In this respect, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) , Eichengreen (2004) and Pichelmann and Roeger (2004) consider that trying to coordinate fiscal policies is a nuisance since it deviates attention from the most important challenge of the European authorities, namely, coordinating their structural reforms policies. Notwithstanding the progress made in the Amsterdam Council (1999), the main responsibility for carrying out reforms in capital, labor and products markets still lies with member states. The Lisbon Strategy provides a mechanism for coordination in areas such as labor markets, namely, the open method of coordination (OMC). The OMC is based on a voluntary participation of member states and is not armed with any legal sanctions: it can only use informal means of enforcement. The only pressures on countries can be exerted through mutual information and assessment.
In our framework, this setting implies that only the first stage develops in a cooperative fashion. Therefore, the problem faced by governments in that stage is:
, whose solution is:
As a consequence substituting (12) into (3) deficits are:
Result 4: When cooperation only applies to the implementation of structural reforms, not only them but also budget deficits are suboptimally high.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The social optimum can be interpreted as the regime in which cooperation occurs in both the first and final stages of the game. Therefore, if such cooperation does not apply to the last stage, fiscal authorities will not internalize the negative externalities of deficits which, as a result, will be suboptimally high. In this context, if governments collectively determine structural reforms they will aim at creating the appropriate incentives so that this fiscal imbalances are reduced. This will be achieved by implementing a high level of reforms, which will increase beyond the social optimum.
Now we compare the regime in which cooperation only applies to reforms with the scenario where all the stages of the game develop in a noncooperative way.
Result 5: Comparing the regime where structural reforms are collectively implemented but fiscal policies are determined at the national level with the scenario in which both policies are determined in a non-cooperative fashion, in the former, social welfare and the level of reforms are higher and budget deficits are lower.
The explanation why we obtain this result is as follows. To begin with, note that since in both regimes the last stage develops in the same (non-cooperative) way, in the case where structural reforms are collectively implemented, choosing the level of such reforms corresponding to the other scenario is an available option. However, since structural reforms generate positive externalities, their complete internalization in the cooperative regime implies that their level -and, therefore, welfare-will be higher than in the case where reforms are decided at the national level. This higher level of reforms makes economies less rigid and, as a consequence, more resilient to adverse disturbances. Therefore, when such shocks take place the need for making use of budget deficits as a means of stabilizing the economy is less important and, as a result, fiscal imbalances will be smaller. However, social welfare would improve even more if cooperation is applied not only to the design of reforms but also to the implementation of fiscal policies since, in this scenario, all the externalities involved would be internalized.
Conclusions
The formation of the EMU have prompted a deep interest among academics and practitioners in how fiscal community institutions should be designed so that the negative externalities generated by budget deficits in member countries are reduced without undermining the stabilizing role of fiscal policy. On the other hand, a wide consensus has emerged on the need to implement deep structural reforms if the economies of the union are to increase their competitiveness and dynamism in line with the goals set by the Lisbon Council (2000) .
The aim of this paper has been to explore the interrelations between the implementation of structural reforms and the determination of fiscal polices in the context of the EMU. With this purpose it has made use of game theory in order to focus on the strategic aspects involved.
In a setup in which budget deficits and structural reforms are decided on a national level, we have characterized a set of rules that achieves the global social optimum by penalizing member countries' excessive fiscal imbalances and the non-implementation of reforms. However, the empirical evidence does not support the enforceability of such kind of commitments within the union. More specifically, the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact was undermined when France and Germany were not fined, in spite of not having abided by the rules for fiscal discipline contained in this pact.
These developments have led us to consider an alternative setting where ex-ante fiscal and reform rules are non-existent or, which is equivalent, lack credibility. In this context, and bearing in mind the emphasis put by the European Commission on the need to coordinate fiscal policies in the union, we have studied a regime where member countries determine their budget deficits by cooperating ex-post, that is, taking into account the level of reforms previously implemented and the shocks hitting the economy. In practice, the institution through which this kind of "ad hoc" cooperation would be achieved is the Euro Group. In this sense, we have shown that if this kind of coordination does not include the implementation of structural reforms, incentives to carry out such reforms will decrease. As a result fiscal cooperation ex-post can turn out to be counterproductive. That is, social welfare could be lower than in the scenario where deficits are determined at the national level.
This analysis rationalizes the widespread view that, despite the consensus about the need for carrying out more structural reforms (as agreed in the Lisbon Council), member countries seem not to be facing the right incentives to do so. This issue is particularly relevant in the present context where countries in the union have been affected by the worldwide economic slowdown.
In this sense, the paper highlights the risk of focusing just on fiscal policy coordination but delaying structural reforms.
Moreover, our framework helps discuss the recent Greek debt crisis which has been the cause of great concern among the other members of the union. The reason being the negative external effects on the other partners that the lack of fiscal discipline in Greece generates, extending the risk of contagion through the banking sector (two-thirds of the Greek public debt is held by non-residents, specially by German banks). Our paper shows that this prisoner's dilemma outcome is aggravated when, as in the case of the European Union, countries lack the right incentives to carry out a sufficiently high level of structural reforms. The explanation of this result is as follows. Reforms make economies less vulnerable to adverse shocks and, therefore, less dependent on fiscal stabilization. Therefore, reforms generate positive spillovers but because their implementation is costly, they will be suboptimally low if they are not collectively determined but decided on the national level.
This free-rider problem is exacerbated when countries in the union like Greece have weak governments that are not prepared to pay the political costs of pushing through long-delayed unpopular structural reform. In this case, weak executives could tackle the problem by convincing national voters that the politically unpleasant measures required were imposed by a supranational authority as the EU or the IMF (and not implementing them would trigger a harsh enough penalty). In this sense, the EU has emphasized that it is urgent to adopt a "comprehensive structural reform package". However, the search of technologies that guarantee that cooperative commitments are fully met by all member countries is an important challenge faced by the union. Even though the EU has its own laws and institutions, not only the Greek government but also its counterparts in the union abide by them only when they are perceived in their own individual (or political) interests. As the EU or the European Central Bank alone are not in a good position to impose conditionality once money in a rescue package starts to come on stream, this ability to impose conditionality has been increased with the presence of the IMF in a joint rescue package for Greece together with the EU. A program that ties financial support to the progressive achievement of fiscal and structural reform goals.
Finally, as long as the union succeeds in overcoming a Europe governance with many governments, the goals set in Lisbon, namely, to make Europe "the most dynamic and competitive economy in the world" will keep on being what Alesina and Perotti (2004) have called 'a myriad of meaningless pompous statements'.
Appendix
This section provides the proof of the main results of the paper.
Proof of Result 1
To begin with, as far the structural reforms are concerned, computing the difference between the denominators in equations (5) and (8) one finds:
The positive sign of expression (14) implies that, when fiscal and structural reforms policies are determined at the national level, the level of such reforms is suboptimally low.
In order to compare budget deficit in both scenarios we rearrange (6) in this way:
σδ e φx ασE(x 2 )(β+α)(α 2 +σ) ( σ+α 2 −β 2 ) +δ(σ+α 2 −αβ)(σ+α 2 +αβ) 2 ( σ 2 +2σα 2 +α 4 −α 2 β 2 )
.
Now, subtracting the denominator of (15) from the one in (9) yields: (δ (σ + α 2 + αβ) (σ + α (α − β)) + Z 5 ) β (α + β)
¢ . Expression (16) is positive because α ≥ β (see section 2) and therefore (α − β) ≥ 0 and ¡ α 2 − β 2 ¢ ≥ 0. Then, we conclude that, when decisions on fiscal policies and reforms are decided at a national level, deficits are suboptimally high.
Proof of Proposition 1
In the last stage, each government solves:
which yields the following Nash equilibrium:
³ e φ − φ i´− αβ ³ e φ − φ j´´x (σ + α 2 ) 2 − (αβ) 2 + t (t + 2σ + 2α 2 ) .
Now, since in the first stage reforms will be optimal (expression (8)) the budget deficit will be (substituting (8) into (17)):
Therefore, for deficits are to achieve optimal levels, their "penalizing rate" (t) must be such that the following condition holds (from (9) and (18)):
where Z 6 = (α + β) 2 σE (x 2 ) + ¡ σ + (α + β) 2 ¢ δ, and whose solution is:
This is precisely the value of t referred to in Proposition 1. As a consequence, in the first stage, each government faces the following problem:
.t.
, t = β (α + β) , whose solution leads to the Nash equilibrium:
where:
Therefore, the "penalization rate" g must satisfy (equating (20) and (8) , whose solution is:
This is precisely the value of g appearing in Proposition 1.
Proof of Result 2
First, we show that the cooperation fiscal ex-post implies that structural reforms are suboptimally low . The reason is that the difference between the denominator in (10) and (8) is the following positive expression:
Second, in order to prove that in this regime deficits are suboptimally high we rewrite expression (11) as:
σδ e φx σE(x 2 )(α+β)((α+β)(α−β) 2 +ασ)+δ(σ+(α+β)
2 )(σ+(α−β) 2 ) ((α−β) 2 +σ)
Thus, subtracting the denominator in (23) from the one in (9) one finds:
Since (24) is positive, in the regime of fiscal cooperation ex-post deficits are suboptimally high.
at the national level. Now, deficits in the former regime are lower since, subtracting the denominator of (15) from the one in (13) , one finds this function of the parameters: β (σβ + α 2 β + σα + α 3 ) σ 2 E (x 2 ) (σ + α 2 + αβ) (σ + α 2 − αβ) ,
which is positive.
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